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Reply to Gauker 
 
François Recanati 
 
 
Gauker distinguishes between two broad families of approaches to 
communication. The first family, which he dislikes, he calls the conveyance 
conception. On that sort of view, the speaker intends to communicate a cer-
tain thought content which is somehow given, independently of the utterance, 
and is not simply defined in terms of the conventional meaning of the words 
used and the context. Of the ‘direct’ version of the view, according to which 
what the speaker says is the content of the thought he intends to communicate 
by his utterance, Gauker says that he is not sure whether any living philoso-
pher of language holds it. (I think Stephen Neale does.) The indirect version 
is more widespread, and Gauker ascribes it to me. On that version what is said 
is defined, inter alia, in terms of the conventional meaning of the words used 
and the context and may therefore be different from the content the speaker in-
tends to communicate by his utterance (even though what the speaker intends 
to communicate may be one of the factors that determine what is said — that’s 
what Gauker calls the ‘impure’ variant of the indirect version). 
According to the other family of approaches, there is no thought con-
tent that preexists to linguistic articulation: thought content comes into being 
through linguistic articulation, so there is no basis for a distinction between 
the thought content one intends to communicate and the thought content one 
actually expresses. (Or so Gauker thinks.) Here also Gauker distinguishes be-
tween several versions of the approach. On the ‘single-content view’, com-
munication succeeds when the hearer grasps the content which the speaker 
expresses by his utterance (what he says). On the ‘no-content view’, which 
Gauker favors, no content needs to be shared for communication to succeed. 
Communication is the use of language to facilitate interpersonal cooperation, 
and that need not involve content sharing. 
Which view exactly do I hold, asks Gauker? Well, there are ingredients I 
like on both sides of the divide he describes. Like him, I don’t believe that 
communication necessarily involves content sharing (because indexical thoughts 
often can’t be shared). Communication, rather, involves some form of coordina-
tion of thoughts [Recanati (2012)]. Like Gauker also I am sympathetic to the 
view that conceptual thought is not independent of linguistic articulation. 
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Still, I want to retain a distinction between the thought the speaker attempts 
to communicate, and the content he actually expresses (what he ‘says’).1 To 
that extent Gauker is right to ascribe the indirect version of the conveyance 
conception to me. He is right also to describe the version I hold as ‘impure’ 
since I take the speaker’s intentions to contribute to determining what is said. 
But — to answer a question he asks repeatedly — it is not the speaker’s actu-
al intention that matters; what matters is the intention which it would be rea-
sonable to ascribe to the speaker in the speech context. 
Gauker insists that semantics and pragmatics should be aimed not mere-
ly at a theory of linguistic communication, but also at an account of the logi-
cal relations between sentences. He acknowledges that one can, in my 
framework, characterize various notions of validity and consistency: validi-
ty/consistency in the saturation sense and in the modulation sense, as he puts it. 
But, he objects, neither the saturation versions nor the modulation versions fill 
the bill, as there are logical facts which we can’t capture using these notions. 
Among the logical facts that can’t be captured in my framework is the 
invalidity of the following argument, which Gauker calls ‘Weather Down’: 
 
It is raining somewhere 
 
Therefore it is raining 
 
According to Gauker, the only way I could account for the intuitive invalidity 
of Weather Down is in terms of ‘validity in the modulation sense’ (because, 
in the saturation sense, the argument is valid, given my semantic analysis of 
‘it is raining’ as saying merely that a rain event is occurring). But validity in 
the modulation sense can’t be the right notion to use because if it were, we 
could not account for the intuitive inconsistency of 
 
(1) It is raining and it is not raining. 
 
In the modulation sense, indeed, that sentence is consistent (since nothing 
prevents us from modulating the two conjuncts differently so as to mean that 
it’s raining in Paris and not raining in Palo Alto). Of course, I could say that 
Weather Down is invalid in the modulation sense, while (1) is inconsistent in 
the saturation sense; but Gauker feels that ‘the reason why (1) is inconsistent 
is basically the same as the reason why Weather Down is invalid’: 
 
The reason is that when we say ‘it is raining’, a location in some sense stands in 
the background. (1) is inconsistent because the same location is in the back-
ground for both conjuncts, and Weather Down is invalid because even if it is 
raining somewhere, it may not be raining at the location in the background [this 
volume, p.xx]. 
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Let us assume that this is right, i.e. that Weather Down is invalid and (1) in-
consistent for the reason Gauker gives. He concludes that to account for the 
logical facts, we need to countenance ‘a kind of context-relativity that does 
not show up anywhere in Recanati’s taxonomy’. I find this conclusion puz-
zling, for (it seems to me) I do make room for that extra form of context-
dependence, distinct from both saturation and modulation, even though I only 
mention it incidentally in Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, (pp. 23-24, 112), 
114. That third form of context-dependence I call ‘circumstance relativity’ 
[Recanati (2007), pp. 3-6]. The idea is that whenever we say (or think) some-
thing, what we say or think (the ‘lekton’) is to be evaluated with respect to a 
situation which our thought or speech concerns. The situation of evaluation 
(the place of rain in the case of ‘it’s raining’) is determined by contextual fac-
tors, but the contextual determination of the relevant situation is neither satu-
ration nor modulation. I draw a distinction between two levels of meaning: 
the lekton and the Austinian proposition (i.e. the lekton plus the contextually 
relevant situation of evaluation). Notions like saturation and modulation only 
apply at the level of the lekton [Recanati (2010), p. 114n]. I say that the loca-
tion ingredient in ‘it is raining’ can be accounted for in terms of circum-
stance-relativity, i.e. at the level of the Austinian proposition (rather than in 
terms of saturation or modulation at the lekton level), and I even say that 
‘deep down, that is the account I favour’ [Recanati (2010), p. 112]. So I think 
I could account for the logical facts Gauker talks about (assuming they are 
facts) in much the same way as he does: by pointing out that if we evaluate 
the whole of (1) with respect to a single situation of evaluation (instead of a 
varying the situation for each of the conjuncts) we get an inconsistency, and 
similarly for Weather Down — if we evaluate the whole argument (premise 
and conclusion) against the same situation s, we find that the premise can be 
true (if there is a situation s’ ≠ s which is rainy) and the conclusion false (if s 
itself is not rainy). That means that the argument is invalid. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 According to me, it’s perfectly possible to hold (with Gauker) that thought is 
inner speech and still distinguish between the thought in one’s mind and the thought 
one expresses in overt speech. These issues are discussed (to a certain extent) in chap-
ter 4 of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. 
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